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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine if a major health system developed a unique app for
detecting new cases of COVID-19 up to a week before the current, widely
used Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) tests. Users of the app would be
required to wear a smartwatch capable of tracking their heart rate for
at least eight hours each day. They would also fill out a baseline
questionnaire with their age, BMI, gender, race, ethnicity, occupation
and medical history, as well as a daily questionnaire reporting any
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COVID-19-related symptoms they are experiencing and results of any
COVID-19 tests.1
Now consider an algorithm that could use a broader range of
information that many wearable devices like smartphones,
smartwatches, and Fitbit devices regularly collect, including heart rate,
step counts, sleep patterns, and others, to identify that someone likely
has contracted COVID-19 up to nine days before they show any
symptoms.2 Surely most individuals would applaud these new tools.
They leverage the technologies many people routinely use, and the
information they already regularly share with private companies, to
potentially save lives and mitigate the devastating economic effects of
the pandemic. Indeed, press accounts of these promising new
technologies lauded them as potentially powerful new tools to control
the spread of COVID-19.3
While each of these tools clearly raises privacy concerns, those
concerns could be managed with relatively routine protections, like
requiring informed consent and applying the kinds of controls already
used to protect sensitive health information. We might even design
some additional protections to ensure that identifiable information is
immediately destroyed after it is processed and that only de-identified
and aggregated data is kept for later analysis.
In light of the tremendous potential—the possibility of saving
thousands of lives—it would seem unreasonable to declare that the
privacy risks these tools pose should stop us from piloting them. We
should at least try to save lives, even if the preliminary studies
acknowledged the need to test these tools with much larger numbers of
people to ensure they work (and that it seems clear the tools will require
widespread testing to work well).4 Likewise, it would be foolish to

1 Robert P. Hirten et al., Physiological Data from a Wearable Device Identifies SARSCoV-2 Infection and Symptoms and Predicts COVID-19 Diagnosis: Observational Study, 23
J. MED. INTERNET RES. 2, 4 (2021) .
2 See Tejaswini Mishra, et al., Pre-Symptomatic Detection of COVID-19 from
Smartwatch Data, 4 NATURE BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 1208 (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41551-020-00640-6.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Megan Cerullo, Smartwatches Can Help Detect COVID-19 Days Before
Symptoms Appear, CBS NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/covidsymptoms-smart-watch/; Chance Miller, New Studies Show How Apple Watch Can Help
Detect COVID-19 Prior to Symptoms and Testing, 9TO5MAC (Jan. 16, 2021),
https://9to5mac.com/2021/01/16/apple-watch-covid-studies-detection; Darrell
Etherington, Mount Sinai Study Finds Apple Watch Can Predict COVID-19 Diagnosis up to
a Week Before Testing, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2021), https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/
09/mount-sinai-study-finds-apple-watch-can-predict-covid-19-diagnosis-up-to-aweek-before-testing.
4 See Hirten et al., supra note 1; Mishra et al., supra note 2.
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declare that these apps should never collect specific types of sensitive
information that health authorities could use to combat the pandemic.
Yet, that is precisely what happened with early proposals during
the COVID-19 pandemic. The possibility that digital contact tracing apps
could collect personal information that most people already routinely
share was dismissed by many as too invasive and risky in spite of the
fact that these apps offered even stronger privacy protections than the
tools just described and at least equal and possibly greater potential
benefits to society.5 At the same time, Google and Apple exerted their
nearly complete control over the global smartphone market to force
governments across the world to enforce the hasty consensus that
digital contact tracing apps should be prohibited from collecting
location or information other than anonymized Bluetooth identifiers
designed to estimate if a user was exposed to the virus.
Much commentary on digital contact tracing and other tools has
shown a puzzling resistance to thinking through how these apps could
allow public health officials to responsibly collect information to aid
their efforts in combating the virus while still respecting pre-existing
privacy norms in the public health context. Instead, a confounding
consensus has emerged that even basic information like location data
should be off the table because of the privacy risks its collection raises
even though public health authorities routinely collect and responsibly
use that same information to combat the spread of infectious disease
through manual contact tracing and other processes.6 This consensus
ignores both the privacy tradeoffs society routinely makes in the public
health context to protect ourselves from far lesser threats, as well as the

5 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer & Brian Ray, COVID-19 Apps Are Terrible—They Didn’t
Have to Be, LAWFARE DIGITAL SOCIAL CONTRACT (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/covid-19-apps-are-terrible-they-didnt-have-be.
6 See, e.g., Dali Kafaar et al., Joint Statement on Contact Tracing: Date 19th April 2020
(Apr. 19, 2020), https://giuper.github.io/JointStatement.pdf (“Bluetooth-based
solutions for automated contact tracing are strongly preferred [over GPS location] when
available.”); World Health Org., Ethical Considerations to Guide the Use of Digital
Proximity Tracking Technologies for COVID-19 Contact Tracing: Interim Guidance 3 (May
28, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Ethics_
Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1 (“[D]ata collection should not require the identity or
location data of a user, or a time stamp of a proximity event.”); Euro. Data Protection
Board, Guidelines 04/2020 on the Use of Location Data and Contact Tracing Tools in the
Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak (Apr. 21, 2020) https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/
files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf;
(“[C]ontact tracing apps do not require tracking the location of individual users. Instead,
proximity data should be used.”); Paige M.. Boshell, The Power of Place: Geolocation
Tracking and Privacy, A.B.A. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/03/
power-place-geolocation-tracking-privacy (describing how private companies collect
consumer location data).
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creative approaches that were emerging to responsibly use location and
other information while still protecting privacy.7
The result is that the digital contact tracing apps in operation today
protect privacy at the expense of efficacy and equity. They are
underpowered by design, undersubscribed and ironically untrusted in
spite (or perhaps because) of the extraordinary measures these tech
giants have taken to protect privacy.8 As of early 2021, fewer than half
of the states in the United States (“U.S.”) have even proposed using a
contact tracing or exposure notification app.9 Even in those, download
rates are low and usage rates even lower.10 These miserable statistics
seem to prove correct early critics who argued that proposals to use
digital contact tracing to help combat the pandemic were, as one
prominent technologist put it, “just plain dumb.”11
But these statistics are based solely on experience with the specific
system that Google and Apple develop. By design and policy, that
system prevents health authorities from using these apps to collect the
same kinds of information they already use to understand and prevent
the spread of communicable disease. These same limits effectively shut
down alternative models that were emerging and that proposed to
responsibly collect other information that could have made these apps
more effective and accessible. That same information is critical to help
understand whether these apps work as well as how this disease and
the apps themselves affect the most vulnerable communities.
This Essay describes how the privacy debate that emerged over
digital contact tracing and Google’s and Apple’s decisions to strictly limit
apps permitted to use their platforms resulted in undercutting their
potential usefulness as a tool to combat the pandemic while still failing
to engender trust in these tools as intended. Part II describes the

7

See infra Part II.B.
See Lindsay Muscato, Why People Don’t Trust Contact Tracing Apps and What to
Do About It, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/
11/12/1012033/why-people-dont-trust-contact-tracing-apps-and-what-to-do-aboutit; Alejandro De La Garza, Contact Tracing Apps Were Big Tech’s Best Idea for Fighting
COVID-19. Why Haven’t They Helped?, TIME (Nov. 10, 2020), https://time.com/59057
72/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps.
9 See Zac Hall, Which U.S. States Are Using Apple’s Exposure Notification API for
COVID-19 Contact Tracing?, 9TO5MAC (Jan. 16, 2021), https://9to5mac.com/2021/01/
16/covid-19-exposure-notification-api-states.
10 See Muscato, supra note 8; De La Garza, supra note 8.
11 Bruce Schneier, Me on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY BLOG
(May 1, 2020), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/me_on_covid-19;
see also Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the COVID-19
Crisis, BROOKINGS TECH STREAM (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/
inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster.
8
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Google-Apple exposure notification system that quickly became the
dominant model for digital contact tracing in the U.S. and Europe and
the alternatives that were emerging early in the pandemic that Google’s
and Apple’s entries into digital contact tracing effectively preempted.
Part III briefly recounts the factors that resulted in the privacy
consensus that emerged early in the pandemic and that the GoogleApple system embodies. That consensus developed out of legitimate
concerns that the federal government, in particular, would use the
pandemic to expand domestic surveillance in ways similar to the post9/11 era, as well as the growing resistance to the exploitation of
consumer data by large technology companies. Two related phenomena
reinforced it. First, pre-existing concerns over expansion of police
surveillance were intensified by extensive use of social media and other
sources to surveil the Black Lives Matter protests in Spring 2020.
Second, the growing resistance to government response efforts,
including mask orders and lockdowns, created tremendous political
opposition to any expansion of state power.
Part IV argues that a contextual understanding of privacy in the
public health context generally, and this pandemic, specifically, would
allow for potentially more effective apps that permit health authorities
responsibly to collect and use more information. It compares the
Google-Apple Bluetooth-only system with the original Safe Paths
proposal to combine that Bluetooth proximity tool with location
information to illustrate this. Part IV then explores how other types of
information have the potential to make these apps even more powerful
tools and why some of that information is critical to evaluating whether
these tools are working and how they are affecting different
communities.
Part V identifies a minimum set of principles that a pandemic
privacy law should include to enable responsible use of data to protect
public health during future pandemics. Such a law would enable
responsible use of both individual and aggregate information while still
protecting against the core privacy and equity concerns raised by digital
contact tracing.
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II. DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING
A. The Google-Apple System
Most commentary to date has focused on apps using the very
specific system that Google and Apple adapted from similar early
models and established as the de facto international standard for apps
permitted to use the interoperable Bluetooth function they created.12
These tech giants labeled their system as performing “exposure
notification” or proximity tracking to distinguish it from traditional
contact tracing.13 The system allows users only to identify that they
have come into close proximity with someone who has tested positive
rather than providing the detailed location and other information
collected in traditional contact tracing. Applications using the system—
and more recently the hardware function embedded in smartphones
using Apple’s or Google’s respective operating systems—allow users to
turn on a Bluetooth function that operates in the phone’s background by
sending and storing on each user’s device rotating identifiers or keys to
anonymously identify a device.14 These keys are collected when two or
more users running the app come into close contact for a defined period
of time, typically fifteen minutes. The app incorporates an algorithm to
estimate the distance between users based on the strength of the
Bluetooth signal received from another device. The keys do not include
location, time, or any other identifying information, only the fact that
there likely was a close contact with another anonymized user.15
In addition to limiting the information these apps collect, Google
and Apple also have imposed a stricter set of policies on them than they
place on run-of-the-mine consumer applications.16 To start, they

12 See, e.g., Casey Newton, Why Countries Keep Bowing to Apple and Google’s Contact
Tracing App Requirements, THE VERGE (May 8, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/
interface/2020/5/8/21250744/apple-google-contact-tracing-england-germanyexposure-notification-india-privacy; Apple and Google, Exposure Notification: Bluetooth
Specification, Preliminary—Subject to Modification and Extension, Apr. 2020 v1.2 (Apr.
2020) [hereinafter Bluetooth Specification], https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/
applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotificationBluetoothSpecificationv1.2.pdf.
13 See Matthew Panzarino, Apple and Google Are Launching a Joint COVID-19 Tracing
Tool for iOS and Android, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 10, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/
04/10/apple-and-google-are-launching-a-joint-covid-19-tracing-tool.
14 See id.; see also Bluetooth Specification, supra note 12.
15 Panzarino, supra note 13.
16 See Khari Johnson, Apple and Google Prohibit Location Tracking in New Contact
Tracing Guidelines, VENTURE BEAT (May 4, 2020), https://venturebeat.com/2020/05/
04/apple-and-google-prohibit-location-tracking-in-new-contact-tracing-guidelines;
APPLE, Exposure Notification APIs Addendum, 1–3 (May 4, 2020) [hereinafter, Apple
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prohibit apps using this tool from allowing users to enable the app to
collect any information other than the Bluetooth keys. Apps also are
required to store those keys on a user’s device unless and until the user
tests positive and separately consents to provide the stored keys to a
server maintained by a public health authority. A public health
authority must either develop the app or sponsor it and the companies
permit only one app per state in the U.S.17
If your goal is to minimize privacy risks at any cost, then this
approach makes sense.
The system stores only anonymized
information that is extremely difficult to connect to any other
information to identify a user. It also gives users complete control over
whether to share even that information with anyone, including public
health authorities. Finally, it limits access to that information to health
authorities and requires that health authorities provide an official code
for users to self-identify as receiving a positive COVID-19 diagnosis.18
The problem is that several of these protections compromise the
system’s effectiveness. Using Bluetooth has several distinct advantages
for contact tracing over alternatives like location tracking using GPS and
cell tower data. Bluetooth operates by devices signaling each other
rather than a satellite or cell tower so it can function underground and
inside buildings. Bluetooth also is better suited than sources like GPS or
Wi-Fi signals for estimating whether a person was within the six-feet
distance epidemiologists agree is necessary for potential exposure.19
But collecting only Bluetooth-based proximity information without
related context, especially location and time, reduces the app to doing
only one thing: alerting a user that she may have been exposed to an
infected person.20 This substantially limits what both users and health
authorities can do with the app. It also makes the app itself less
reliable.21
Exposure Notification], https://developer.apple.com/contact/request/download/
Exposure_Notification_Addendum.pdf.
17 See Johnson, supra note 16; Apple Exposure Notification, supra note 16.
18 Johnson, supra note 16.
19 See Ramesh Raskar et al., Contact Tracing: Holistic Solution Beyond Bluetooth
[hereinafter Holistic Solution], https://github.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/
blob/master/ContactTracingBeyondBluetooth.pdf; see also COVID SafePaths, COVID-19
Contact-Tracing Mobile Apps: Evaluation and Assessment for Decision Makers, at 12
[hereinafter COVID SafePaths], https://github.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/
blob/master/apps-evaluation.pdf.
20 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; COVID SafePaths, supra note 19.
21 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; Camera Culture Group, MIT Media Lab, Adding
Location Context to Apple/Google Exposure Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths
Encryption Proposals for GPS + Bluetooth, Ver. 0.1, (Apr. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Adding
Location Context].
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Manual contact tracing involves identifying where someone who
has tested positive recently visited and whom they may have exposed.22
Without collecting contextual information, including the location and
time of potential exposures as measured by the Bluetooth signal, the
Google-Apple system cannot be used by manual contact tracers either
to identify potential new cases or augment a person’s memory. That
system also cannot provide other useful information like identifying
infected spaces for decontamination or assist in predicting likely future
infection hotspots.23 Instead, Apple and Google have created an entirely
separate, relatively unreliable, system that, at best, offers the possibility
that new cases could be identified even before the traditional process.
Even that limited promise requires a significant number of people
to download and start running the app on a regular basis. Early research
on Bluetooth-only models suggested that close to 60% of smartphone
users would need to use an app to substantially reduce the spread of the
virus, although lower rates could have some impact.24
Bluetooth-only systems also are highly imprecise and create
significant risk of both
incorrectly identifying a potential exposure (false positive) or
failing to trigger a notification even after an epidemiologically
significant contact (false negative).25 Even in controlled settings, the
signal strength naturally fluctuates itself and differs by device.26 Signal
strength is highly sensitive to where a person places their device as well
as the surrounding environment. Simply rotating one’s body or placing
a device in a bag can significantly reduce the signal’s strength resulting
in a false negative.27 Reflective surfaces, like a subway or train car, can
amplify the signal, and Bluetooth also passes through many walls.
Either situation can create a false positive alert.28

22

See COVID SafePaths, supra note 19, at 6.
Holistic Solution, supra note 19.
24 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, No, Coronavirus Apps Don’t Need 60% Adoption to be
Effective, MIT TECH REVIEW (June 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/
06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effective-at-less-than-60-percent-download.
25 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; Jeremy Hsu, Contact Tracing Apps Struggle to
Be Both Effective and Private, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 24, 2020), https://spectrum.
ieee.org/biomedical/devices/contact-tracing-apps-struggle-to-be-both-effective-andprivate.
26 Amy Robinson & Jim Waldo, Technical Difficulties of Contact Tracing, LAWFARE
(Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/technical-difficulties-contact-tracing.
27 Id.
28 Id.
23
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False positives can overburden health systems where testing
capacity is limited and can cause economic hardship if they trigger an
unnecessary quarantine. False negatives may seem innocuous but risk
creating a false sense of security that could embolden people to take
greater risks.29 More broadly, people are far less likely to use or trust a
tool that does not work.30 Indeed, paradoxically, by prioritizing privacy
over efficacy, Google and Apple may well have undermined the very
trust they intended to develop.
Furthermore, these same limitations that make the apps less useful
and unreliable also make it impossible to directly assess whether they
work.31 Without allowing even the user herself to learn where and when
a likely exposure occurred, it is impossible to determine whether the
notification was accurate.32 These limits also prevent health authorities
from using the information to understand the disease better. And by
prohibiting health authorities from collecting any other user
information, the system also precludes any analysis of how different
demographic groups are affected by the disease and the apps
themselves.
B. The Path Not Taken
Before Google and Apple announced these restrictions, there was
tremendous excitement about a range of creative possibilities for
incorporating the interoperable Bluetooth standard they were
developing into more sophisticated applications. These applications
proposed to collect other potentially useful data, including symptoms to
allow individuals to calibrate their own risk better when deciding
whether to self-isolate and researchers to understand this new disease

29

Id.
See Gabriel Kaptchuk et al., How Good is Good Enough for COVID19 Apps? The
Influence of Benefits, Benefits, Accuracy, and Privacy on Willingness to Adopt, ARXIV (May
20, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.04343.pdf.
31 See Nicole Wetsman, Contact Tracing Apps Promised Big and Didn’t Deliver, THE
VERGE (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/22168473/coronavirus-contacttracing-apps-exposure-notification-covid-google-apple (noting that “because of the
apps’ focus on privacy, it may be nearly impossible to quantify how well they’re actually
able to help prevent disease”).
32 See, e.g., id. (noting that researchers cannot identify “how many of the people who
receive notifications on the apps follow isolation guidelines or get tested for COVID19”); Mark Briers et al., Demonstrating the Impact of the NHS COVID-19 App, ALAN TURING
INSTITUTE (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.turing.ac.uk/blog/demonstrating-impact-nhscovid-19-app (“The decentralised design of the app means that it is not possible to
directly measure the number of notifications that each individual index case
generates.”).
30

1476

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1467

better.33 Rather than spurring that kind of innovation and allowing
public health authorities to drive the configuration of these apps, Apple
and Google effectively prevented their tool from doing anything other
than exposure notification.
Many of these alternative apps envisioned incorporating the
proximity advantages of the interoperable Google-Apple Bluetooth
system with other information, especially the time and location
information critical for contact tracing, to create a more effective tool.34
These apps also featured innovative approaches to protecting user
privacy very differently from the one-size-fits-all model Apple and
Google ultimately imposed.35 Indeed, Google’s public announcement
seemed to anticipate such collaborations by noting that the secondphase plan to embed the Bluetooth tool into each company’s operating
system would “enable interaction with a broader ecosystem of apps and
government health authorities.”36
Safe Paths, a system developed by MIT researchers in consultation
with the Mayo Clinic and spun off into the non-profit PathCheck
Foundation, was one of the earliest and most prominent of these apps.37
The original Safe Paths system included two components: (1) a
smartphone-based app and (2) a centralized repository run by health
authorities. The app was designed to collect both Bluetooth proximity
information and GPS location data. As the Safe Paths team described in
a series of publications, location information and Bluetooth-based
proximity tools complement each other.38 GPS systems provide location
information which is useful for reconstructing where a person has
33 See, e.g., Hannah Alsdurf et al., COVI White Paper-Ver. 1.1, ARXIV (July 27, 2020),
at 17–20, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.08502.pdf; Erman Ayday et al., ShareTrace: A
Smart Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing Solution by Architectural Design During an
Epidemic, Ver. 1.0 (May 3, 2020), at 11, https://github.com/SafeTrace-community/
info/blob/master/ShareTrace%20-%20WhitePaper_may3.pdf.
34 See, e.g., Maximizing Privacy and Effectiveness in COVID-19 Apps, OPENMINED (Mar.
24, 2020) [hereinafter Maximizing Privacy], https://blog.openmined.org/covid-appprivacy-advice (describing multiple app proposals and advocating for a multi-function,
privacy-protective app).
35 See generally id.; see also Ramesh Raskar et al., Apps Gone Rogue: Maintaining
Personal Privacy in an Epidemic, ARXIV (Mar. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Apps Gone Rogue],
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.08567.pdf.
36 Google, Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, THE
KEYWORD (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.blog.google/inside-google/companyannouncements/apple-and-google-partner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology.
37 Apps Gone Rogue, supra note 35, at 66.
Technical details and a series of
whitepapers regarding Safe Paths and Safe Places are available on the PathCheck public
GitHub site, https://github.com/Path-Check (PathCheck GitHub), and the TripleBlind
Safe Places GitHub site, https://github.com/tripleblindai/safe-places.
38 See Pathcheck Github, supra note 37; COVID SafePaths, supra note 19; Holistic
Solution, supra note 19.
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traveled, but GPS signals are not sufficiently precise to determine if a
person was within the six-foot distance required for exposure.
Bluetooth systems are configured to estimate that six-foot distance but,
as discussed above, often result in false positives and false negatives.
Location and time information provide critical context that mitigates
these errors by allowing an individual to consider where they were, who
was around them and what they were doing when they were exposed.39
The second component of the Safe Paths system, called “Safe
Places,” provided a mechanism designed to permit users to consent to
securely upload both the Bluetooth identifiers and GPS location
information to a public health database as part of the manual contact
tracing process when they test positive for COVID-19.40 Contact tracers
could use the GPS location information directly to confirm, correct and
amplify a person’s memory during the interview process.41 After
removing potentially sensitive locations as part of the interview, the
remaining location information would be de-identified and aggregated
to create public heat maps that allow both users and non-users to selfidentify potential exposures. Public health authorities could also use deidentified and aggregated location information to model and predict the
location of future hotspots.42
Safe Paths incorporated many of the same protections as Apple and
Google. All information is collected on a user’s device and automatically
deleted after 14 days. If a user tests positive she could elect to provide
some or all of the stored information with health authorities. Unlike
Google and Apple, Safe Paths also creates a backend interface for health
authorities to securely upload and process the information users
provide and delete specific locations they did not want to include in the
system. Raw data is then deleted, while only de-identified, aggregated
information is stored and eventually could be published as a public
heatmap.43

39 Camera Culture Group, MIT Media Lab, Adding Location Context to Apple/Google
Exposure Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths Encryption Proposals for GPS +
Bluetooth, Ver. 0.1, Apr. 26, 2020 [hereinafter Adding Location Context].
40 See Anil Ananthaswamy, What Do Public Health Authorities Need for COVID-19?
Thinking beyond Exposure Notification, Contact Tracing and Heatmaps, PATHCHECK
FOUNDATION BLOG, (May 5, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/en/blog/what-do-publichealth-authorities-need-for-covid-19-thinking-beyond-exposure-notification-contacttracing-and-heatmaps. Technical details regarding Safe Places are available on the
PathCheck GitHub site. See PathCheck GitHub, supra note 37.
41 See Adding Location Context, supra note 39, at 33.
42 See Ananthaswamy, supra note 40.
43 Id.
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Safe Paths was one of many alternative approaches that proposed
allowing users to collect potentially useful information while still
protecting their privacy. Other apps proposed creating more refined
risk scores for determining whether to seek testing or self-quarantine
by combining self-reported symptoms with location and Bluetooth
identifiers.44 Still others envisioned incorporating additional
functions.45 It is an open question how well any of these approaches
might have worked but by prohibiting these apps from using their new
tool, and tightly restricting contact tracing apps generally, Google and
Apple never gave them a chance.
III. WHAT WENT WRONG?
Early in the pandemic, the aggressive use of intrusive digital
surveillance by China, South Korea, Israel, and other nations created
legitimate fear that governments across the globe might use public
health as a cover to expand surveillance.46 These fears that health
surveillance tools would be used for law enforcement purposes, rather
than restricted solely to fighting the pandemic, were intensified by
police use of mobile phone and social media information to identify and
arrest people participating in Black Lives Matters protests. Those fears
were intensified when some law enforcement officials conflated those
efforts with contact tracing generally.47

44

See, e.g., Alsdurf et al., supra note 33, at 4 (describing a Canadian app called COVI’s
use of proximity and symptom tracking); Ayday et al., supra note 33, at 8 (proposing the
use of proximity, location and symptom tracking).
45 See Maximizing Privacy, supra note 34 (describing examples including “a white
label COVID Alert App, private set intersection, a differential privacy wrapper, and
private identity”).
46 Peter Swire, Security, Privacy and the Coronavirus: Lessons From 9/11, LAWFARE
(March 24, 2020, 2:46 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/security-privacy-and-coronaviruslessons-911; Natasha Singer & Choe Sang-Hun, As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates,
Personal Privacy Plummets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html.
47 Amos Toh & Deborah Brown, How Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19 Could
Worsen Inequality, JUST SECURITY (June 4, 2020, 2:25 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2020/06/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-covid-19-could-worsen-inequality; Andy
Meek, Minnesota Is Now Using Contact Tracing to Track Protestors, As Demonstrations
Escalate, BGR (May 30, 2020, 10:46 PM), https://bgr.com/2020/05/30/minnesotaprotest-contact-tracing-used-to-track-demonstrators; Isobel Asher Hamilton,
Compulsory Selfies and Contact Tracing: Authorities Everywhere Are Using Smartphones
to Track the Coronavirus, and It’s Part of a Massive Increase in Global Surveillance,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3.
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In fact, in the U.S., state and federal authorities did the opposite.48
They actively distanced themselves from the use of digital contact
tracing apps.49 The privacy concerns about digital contact tracing
dovetailed with the general politicization of other government
pandemic control measures to make even apps using the extremely
limited Google-Apple system controversial. Protests against shutdown
orders and mask mandates extended to both manual and digital contact
tracing. One widely shared Facebook post claimed that federal
legislation to expand and fund manual contact tracing would “give the
government the power to forcibly remove” children from their homes.50
An Ohio lawmaker warned constituents that “[a]rmies of agents” will be
“trained on Apple and Google technology to trace or track people” and
will “forcibly isolate” anyone who tests positive and all of their
contacts.51 Only three states, including South Carolina, initially
announced that they would develop an app using the Google-Apple
system.52 Shortly after South Carolina announced its plans to develop
an app, lawmakers in the state responded by amending a COVID-19
spending bill to ban state agencies from using it.53
As lawmakers in the U.S. went out of their way to prevent adoption
of digital health surveillance tools, press accounts routinely reinforced
fears that the apps under development risked unchecked expansion of
government surveillance.54 Even stories about the Google-Apple system

48

See Bambauer & Ray, supra note 5.
See id.
50 See Angelo Fichera, False Claim of Forced Removals Under Contact Tracing Bill,
FACTCHECK.ORG (May 13, 2020), https://www.factcheck.org/2020/05/false-claim-offorced-removals-under-contact-tracing-bill.
51 Rep. Nino Vitale, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/Rep
Vitale/posts/2898165580261473.
52 See Kif Leswing, Three States Will Use Apple-Google Contact Tracing Technology
for Virus Tracking Apps, CNBC, (last updated May 20, 2020 5:37 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/20/three-states-commit-to-apple-googletechnology-for-virus-tracking-apps.html.
53 Dave Perera, South Carolina Legislature Puts Coronavirus Apps on Hold, MLEX (June
26, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-ofexpertise/data-privacy-and-security/south-carolina-legislature-puts-coronavirusapps-on-hold.
54 See Natasha Singer & Choe Sang-Hun, As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates,
Personal Privacy Plummets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html; Mike Giglio,
Would You Sacrifice Your Privacy to Get Out of Quarantine?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2020),
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-privacy-civilliberties-911/609172.
49
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routinely ignored how it actually works in favor of repeating unfounded
concerns that it poses grave privacy risks.55
Google’s and Apple’s early announcements of their plans to develop
an interoperable Bluetooth standard had a direct chilling effect on the
ecosystem of digital tools that were emerging. Simply by announcing
their common standard in early April 2020, even before it was ready,
they largely preempted plans that other groups, including Safe Paths,
were making with governments in several jurisdictions to move
forward with alternatives.56
Many groups continued to develop alternative models even after
this announcement focused on the possibility of incorporating the
interoperable Bluetooth standard these companies were creating.57
Apple and Google’s later announcement of the restrictions they were
imposing, in particular prohibiting apps using their Bluetooth tool from
collecting location or other information and permitting only one app in
each jurisdiction, essentially shut down those efforts.58
55 See, e.g., Evan Halper, Lawmakers Warn Coronavirus Contact-Tracing Is Ripe for
Abusive Surveillance, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), www.latimes.com/politics/story/202004-26/privacy-americans-trade-off-trace-coronavirus-contacts.
56 Google and Apple announced their partnership on April 10, 2020, and promised
to release the API that apps needed to use it in May. See Google Partner on COVID-19
Contact Tracing Technology, APPLE: NEWSROOM (Apr. 10, 2020) [hereinafter See Google
Partner], https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-oncovid-19-contact-tracing-technology. I spoke with Steve Penrod, CEO of TripleBlind,
one of the partners in the original Safe Paths group on Jan. 28, 2021. See TripleBlind
Github, https://github.com/tripleblindai/privatekit. Penrod said that announcement
immediately slowed down or completely stopped the initial rollouts of the app and plans
they were developing in several communities. See Conversation with Steve Penrod,
Author’s Notes (on file with author). As late as March 18, 2020, Safe Paths was in
discussions with the White House to obtain official support for their system. See Austin
Barnes, White House Expected to Endorse Kansas City-Built COVID-19 Exposure Tracking
App, STARTLAND NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.startlandnews.com/2020/03/
private-kit-safe-paths-triple-blind-covid-19.
57 See, e.g., Safe Paths Alliance, Adding Location Context to Apple/Google Exposure
Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths Encryption Proposals for GPS + Bluetooth,
PATHCHECK (May 5, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/en/blog/adding-locationcontext-to-apple-google-exposure-notification-bluetooth-api-mit-safepathsencryption-proposals-for-gps-bluetooth. When this announcement came out, I was
working with a group of researchers from Case Western Reserve University and the
University College London on a proposal to integrate the Google-Apple Bluetooth tool
into an app designed to collect location, self-reported symptoms and other information
using a completely different set of privacy controls to create a sophisticated risk score.
Our proposal anticipated incorporating the Apple-Google Bluetooth system to provide
proximity information interoperable with other apps. See Ayday et al., supra note 33,
at 11.
58 See, e.g., Erin Simpson & Adam Conner, Digital Contact Tracing to Contain the
Coronavirus, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS: TECH. POL’Y (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/technology-policy/news/2020/04/22/483521/digital-contact-
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These strict limits were both driven by and reinforced the puzzling
consensus among many privacy experts that location information would
not be useful for digital contact tracing. Ignoring recommendations by
leading public health organizations, several institutions including the
World Health Organization and the European Data Protection Board
issued guidelines asserting that contact tracing apps do not require and
should not collect location information.59
Beyond the direct effect on alternative apps hoping to use their
system, Google’s and Apple’s announcements focused attention on a
single tech-company-created paradigm for using digital contact tracing.
This had three negative consequences. First, public concerns about
these companies’ past privacy practices and domineering use of their
control of the mobile technology market raised suspicion that this was
yet another attempt to exploit consumer data for profit.60 Many press
accounts simply ignored the privacy protections the system
incorporated in favor of highlighting mistrust in big tech and incorrectly
implying that the system would give these companies increased access
to valuable health information when in fact their strict policy prohibited
apps from sharing any information with them.61 Indeed, when both

tracing-contain-coronavirus (stating that Google’s and Apple’s announcements in
practice means their “standard is now the sole viable foundation for a contact tracing
app”); Reed Albergotti & Drew Harwell, Apple and Google Are Building a Virus-Tracking
System. Health Officials Say It Will Be Practically Useless, WASH. POST (May 15, 2020, 3:22
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/15/app-apple-googlevirus (Apple and Google’s announcement “sparked a wave of excitement” about
potential to use to collect necessary information including location data).
59 See JEFFREY KAHN ET AL., DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FOR PANDEMIC RESPONSE 2 (Jeffrey
Kahn ed., 2020) (recommending that apps provide users with “easy mechanisms and
prompts to allow for opting-in to” providing location information); WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, CGU Digital Proximity Tracking Contact, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO GUIDE
THE USE OF DIGITAL PROXIMITY TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES FOR COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING, 3 (May
28, 2020) [hereinafter WHO], https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019nCoV-Ethics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1 (“data collection should not require the
identity or location data of a user, or a time stamp of a proximity event”); EUR. DATA PROT.
BD., GUIDELINES 04/2020 ON THE USE OF LOCATION DATA AND CONTACT TRACING TOOLS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK, 7 (Apr. 21, 2020) [hereinafter EDPB],
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_conta
ct_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf (“[C]ontact tracing apps do not require tracking the
location of individual users. Instead, proximity data should be used.”).
60 See Jessica Rich, How Our Outdated Privacy Laws Doomed Contact-Tracing Apps,
BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2021/01/28/how-our-outdated-privacy-laws-doomed-contact-tracing-apps (arguing
that “Americans just weren’t persuaded” by Apple and Google’s privacy measures); Mike
Feibus, Are Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps Doomed to Fail in America?, USA TODAY
(June 24, 2020, 3:46 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2020/
06/24/apple-google-contact-tracing-apps-privacy/3253088001.
61 See Halper, supra note 55; See Google Partner, supra note 56.
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companies incorporated the Bluetooth function into an operating
system update, it caused alarm among many of their customers and
prompted a widespread rumor that the companies secretly installed a
“COVID-19 sensor” on their phones.62
Rather than praising the privacy-above-all approach of the GoogleApple system, press accounts and analyses by privacy advocates often
described the system as posing substantial risks.63 As late as September
2020, the Electronic Frontier Foundation criticized California legislators
for considering adopting the Google-Apple system, warning them not to
trust the tech giants’ offer to create a pilot program free of charge
because often services “offered for ‘free’ are paid for through the
surrender of sensitive personal information.”64 In an ironic twist, many
of those same analyses also cited the same technical constraints used to
protect privacy—the unreliability of using Bluetooth, the need for largescale adoption and the limits of exposure notification compared to
traditional contact tracing—to argue that the system was unlikely to
work.65
Second, Google’s and Apple’s announcements that they were
limiting their systems to Bluetooth-based exposure notification
effectively shut down any discussion of connecting digital contact
tracing apps with other promising approaches to use multiple data
sources in the pandemic response.66 Early in the pandemic, many
groups recommended using various information sources, including
location information to help scale manual contact tracing. In April 2020,
Johns Hopkins’ Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Association
62 See, e.g., Feibus, supra note 60; David Murphy, No, Your Phone Doesn’t Have a
‘COVID-19 Sensor,’ LIFEHACKER (Aug. 18, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://vitals.lifehacker.com/
no-your-phone-doesnt-have-a-covid-19-sensor-1844750938; Rich DeMuro, Yes,
Coronavirus Tracking Was Installed on Your Phone. No, It’s Not Doing Anything (Just Yet),
KTLA5 (Jul. 3, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://ktla.com/morning-news/technology/covidtracking-iphone-android-update.
63 See, e.g., ALBERT FOX CAHN & JOHN YANY VEISZLEMLEIN, STOP: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
OVERSIGHT PROJECT, BEWARE: BLUETOOTH AHEAD 4–7 (2020) (critiquing Google-Apple
system); Bennet Cyphers & Gennie Gebhart, Apple and Google’s COVID-19 Exposure
Notification API: Questions and Answers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2020), (available
at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/apple-and-googles-covid-19-exposurenotification-api-questions-and-answersanswers) (listing privacy concerns and
questioning whether the system will work).
64 Hayley Tsukuyama, California Still Needs Privacy Protections for COVID Tracking
Apps, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/
california-still-needs-privacy-protections-covid-tracking-apps.
65 See, e.g., CAHN & VEISZLEMLEIN, supra note 63, at 7–9; Cyphers and Gebhart, supra
note 63.
66 See, e.g., Project Aurora: A New Open Source Solution for the Google Apple Exposure
Notification API, PATHCHECK FOUND. BLOG (May 20, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/
en/blog/a-new-open-source-solution-for-the-google-apple-exposure-notification-api.
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of State and Territorial Health Officials issued a joint report that called
for using mobile contact tracing applications to collect contacts, location
and self-reported symptoms.67 That same month the Center for
American Progress issued a comprehensive national and state plan for
coronavirus response that recommended adopting tools for
instantaneous contact tracing similar to South Korea’s and Singapore’s,
which used “GPS, Bluetooth, cell tower and Wi-Fi networks” but with
stronger protections for civil liberties.68
In May 2020, another research group issued a comprehensive set
of recommendations for digital contact tracing.
These
recommendations emphasized that contact tracing apps should
incorporate flexible design principles to allow for collection of new
information as our understanding of the disease evolves and to permit
users to opt into providing location information.69
Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics likewise noted that
groups developing apps were increasingly moving toward
incorporating a common Bluetooth architecture as the backbone for
apps with a range of functions that would send “other information (such
as personal information and GPS data)” to public health authorities.70 In
a similar vein, dozens of engineers, executives and epidemiologists
issued an open letter calling on a range of technology companies to do
more to address the pandemic. One of their thirteen recommendations
was that Apple and Google should provide a privacy-preserving
operating system function for contact tracing that included location
information.71 Citing the success of China and South Korea in
conducting large-scale tracing, they called for the feature to allow users
who opt in to determine if they had been in the same locations as
subsequently identified cases.72

67

CRYSTAL WATSON ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH: CTR. FOR HEALTH
SEC., A NATIONAL PLAN TO ENABLE COMPREHENSIVE COVID-19 CASE FINDING AND CONTACT
TRACING IN THE US 6 (2020), https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_
archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200410-national-plan-to-contact-tracing.pdf.
68 Zeke Emanuel et al., A National and State Plan To End the Coronavirus Crisis,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/healthcare/news/2020/04/03/482613/national-state-plan-end-coronaviruscrisis.
69 KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 2–3, 7–10.
70 VI HART ET AL., OUTPACING THE VIRUS: DIGITAL RESPONSE TO CONTAINING THE SPREAD OF
COVID-19 WHILE MITIGATING PRIVACY RISKS, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS 23 (Apr. 3,
2020), https://ethics.harvard.edu/outpacing-virus.
71 Peter Eckersley et al., 13 Things Tech Companies Can Do To Fight Coronavirus: An
Open Letter From Technologists, Epidemiologists & Medical Professionals, TECH VS COVID19 (Apr. 2020), https://stop-covid.tech.
72 Id.
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The ACLU issued a set of recommendations for how policymakers
should evaluate the potential use of tracking technologies to combat the
epidemic. While emphasizing the need for caution, the report
acknowledged that “[t]he challenges posed by COVID-19 are
extraordinary, and we should consider with an open mind any and all
measures that might help contain the virus consistent with our
fundamental principles.”73 Specifically, under the right circumstances
and with appropriate protections, “using certain forms of data
generated by cell phones—such as location histories or records of
proximity to other devices—might make sense.”74
Third, Google’s and Apple’s requirements that each jurisdiction
sponsor a single app, as well as the aggressive pressure they placed on
governments already moving forward with alternatives to abandon
those systems in favor of theirs, while intended to encourage user
adoption, may have had the opposite effect. Most of the dominant
network-dependent apps widely used today launched in small
communities, developed broad adoption in those communities, and
scaled from there.75 Many of the groups developing alternative
approaches were planning to pilot their apps in precisely that way both
to test and refine how they work and to generate trust within local
communities.76
Finally, a lesser-noticed but even more troubling aspect of Google’s
and Apple’s approaches is the startlingly comprehensive control they
were able to exert over public health responses across the world.77 They
73 JAY STANLEY & JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, ACLU, THE LIMITS OF LOCATION TRACKING IN AN
EPIDEMIC 1 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-limitslocation-tracking-epidemic?redirect=aclu-white-paper-limits-location-trackingepidemic.
74 Id.
75 See Chiara Farronato et al., How To Get People to Actually Use Contact-Tracing
Apps, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-to-get-people-toactually-use-contact-tracing-apps.
76 For example, the ShareTrace group that I worked with submitted a proposal to
the National Institutes of Health proposing to pilot the app in one Northeast Ohio suburb
and had started discussions with two local universities and one large health
organization. Safe Paths had agreements with several local governments and nonprofits to pilot their app. See, e.g., Brian Kanerline, KC Business Leaders, Companies Lead
EBusiness Leaders, Companies Lead Effort to do Widespread COVID Contact Tracing, KAN.
CITY BUS. J. (May 9, 2020), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2020/05/
09/executives-companies-lead-contact-tracing-effort.html (describing coalition of
community groups “putting together a campaign to sell the public on using the Safe
Paths app”).
77 Among the few commentaries that have highlighted this issue to date include
Tamar Sharon, Blind-Sided by Privacy? Digital Contact Tracing, the Apple/Google API and
Big Tech’s Newfound Role as Global Health Policy Makers, ETHICS & INFO. TECH. (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7368642.
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forced several governments, including France, Germany, and the UK, to
abandon their plans for digital contact tracing in favor of the limited
Google-Apple system.78 Many of these governments planned to pilot
different designs with alternative approaches to privacy.79 Even
observers who generally approved of the Google-Apple system’s privacy
protections expressed dismay at the companies’ brazen assertion of
monopolistic power to dictate public health responses to the
pandemic.80
IV. PANDEMIC PRIVACY
A. Context
Privacy depends on context.81 Here that context starts with a
highly infectious, often deadly disease that has killed millions of people,
closed schools and universities, and wrought massive economic
damage. In the U.S., common law rules and privacy laws have treated
communicable diseases like COVID-19 as a special circumstance that
justifies entrusting health authorities with rights to use sensitive data to
protect the public.82 Many jurisdictions even affirmatively require—
78 See Alex Webb, Apple and Google Face Off Against Europe Over Contact Tracing,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (May 18, 2020, 12:01 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-05-18/apple-and-google-face-off-against-europe-over-contact-tracing; Douglas
Busvine & Andreas Rinke, Germany Flips to Apple-Google Approach on Smartphone
Contact Tracing, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2020, 3:51 AM), www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-europe-tech/germany-flips-to-apple-google-approach-on-smartphonecontact-tracing-idUSKCN22807J; Leo Kelion, Coronavirus: Apple and France in Stand-Off
Over Contact-Tracing App, BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-52366129.
79 See Ieva Ilves, Why Are Google and Apple Dictating How European Democracies
Fight Coronavirus?, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/16/google-apple-dictating-europeandemocracies-coronavirus.
80 See, e.g., id.; Michael Veale, Privacy is Not the Problem with the Apple-Google
Contact-Tracing Toolkit, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/01/apple-google-contact-tracing-app-techgiant-digital-rights.
81 See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119
(2004). Nissenbaum applies this framework specifically to digital contact tracing tools
in her presentation at Simons Institute, Perspectives on Digital Contact Tracing, YOUTUBE
(July 20, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9J3s4h80Kxw. Nissenbaum
argues that the Google-Apple system prioritized privacy at the expense of legitimate
public health objectives. Id. at 38:00–41:25 min.
82 See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Ebola and the Law in the United States: A Short Guide to
Public Health Authority and Practical Limits 5–13 (Emory Univ. Sch. of L. Res. Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 14-299, 2015) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538187) (describing state and federal laws and application to
Ebola); State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 7,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-
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under the threat of civil or criminal penalties—that health care
professionals and patients notify others who may be at risk of
contracting a communicable disease.83 Likewise, state and federal laws
long have provided health authorities with extraordinary informationgathering powers to combat infectious disease, including repurposing
consumer data collection methods like grocery loyalty cards and even
credit card records to identify individuals at risk of contracting deadly
diseases.84
The context also includes longstanding norms and practices related
to the inherently intrusive manual contact tracing process.85 That
process involves collecting private and often sensitive information to
identify every location a patient may have visited and every person he
or she may have come into close contact with over the roughly twoweek period when the patient likely was infectious. Standardized
disease reporting guidance provides that for suspected COVID-19 cases,
health authorities should gather and report, among other things, patient
demographics, detailed symptoms, and all known contacts or linkages
to COVID-19 cases.86 To collect this information, contact tracers ask
infected people detailed questions about where they have been and who
they have met while they were contagious to identify other potential
cases quickly.87
To assist in containing deadly diseases, health authorities routinely
use multiple data sources outside of manual contact tracing, including
individual consumer data. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)’s website on foodborne illness explicitly calls on
health authorities and food companies to use information from
statutes.aspx; DANIELLE ALLEN ET AL., SECURING JUSTICE, HEALTH AND DEMOCRACY AGAINST THE
COVID-19 THREAT, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS 11–17 (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18ZEiscW_zHgyEn3-k_U2IJj7UgDhbi84/view.
83 See HIV and STD Criminalization Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/exposure.html.
84 Safer Food Saves Lives, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Safer Food Saves Lives], https://bit.ly/3d8Wjnt; see Frederik T. Moller et al.,
Analysis of Consumer Food Purchase Data Used for Outbreak Investigations, A Review, 23
EURO SUREVILLANCE, 1 (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29921346.
85 For an extensive analysis of the public health needs that digital contact tracing
could assist in meeting, see KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 13–14.
86 COUNCIL OF ST. AND TERRITORIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, POSITION STATEMENT NO. INTERIM-20ID-02, UPDATE TO THE STANDARDIZED SURVEILLANCE CASE DEFINITION AND NATIONAL
NOTIFICATION FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) (2020), https://cdn.
ymaws.com/www.cste.org/resource/resmgr/ps/positionstatement2020/Interim-20ID-02_COVID-19.pdf.
87 Investigating a COVID-19 Case, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 23,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contacttracing-plan/investigating-covid-19-case.html.
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individual grocery loyalty cards to identify potential sources of
confirmed salmonella and to notify other individuals who are at risk
from consuming the same contaminated product.88 Likewise, the CDC’s
detailed contact tracing guidelines for COVID-19 list “Google maps” and
“social media/mobile apps” as recommended alternative sources of
information to identify close contacts.89
These general public health norms for communicable disease and
the specific practices related to contact tracing, including the types of
information collected, establish the context in which we should consider
the privacy implications of digital tools to accomplish the same ends.90
Discussing privacy in light of this context and taking into account the
potential for digital health surveillance tools to slow the spread of
disease appropriately recognizes both the risks and benefits of
deploying them.
B. Google-Apple Exposure Notification and Safe Paths Privacy
Comparison
The key questions, then, are: (i) what new privacy risks do digital
contact tracing tools pose compared to the information that health
authorities already collect and (ii) are those risks acceptable in light of
the potential benefits? Comparing the potential risks and benefits of the
Bluetooth-only Google-Apple system and the Safe Paths GPS-plus
Bluetooth proposal in light of the context just described illustrates how
one alternative to the dominant Apple-Google model could have
increased the efficacy of digital contact tracing with very little increase
in privacy risk to individual users.
The Google-Apple system collects far less sensitive information
than manual contact tracing. The system records only rotating,
anonymous identifiers and destroys those identifiers after fourteen
days. These identifiers stay on a user’s device until the user tests
positive and consents to upload them to a central server controlled by a
public health authority to alert other users who may have been exposed.

88

Safer Food Saves Lives, supra note 84.
Case Investigation and Contact-Tracing Guidance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, Appendix B (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/appendix.html#tips.
90 For an extended analysis of these issues from an ethics perspective see Michael J.
Parker et al., Ethics of Instantaneous Contact Tracing Using Mobile Phone Apps in the
Control of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 427–31 (2020), https://jme.
bmj.com/content/medethics/46/7/427.full.pdf.
89
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It is difficult, but not impossible, to re-identify an individual using
those rotating identifiers.91 For example, a person with a Bluetoothenabled camera could use that device to capture identifiers broadcast
by individuals in a specific location and simultaneously “root” their
phone, which is running the app to let them see the Bluetooth identifiers
of other users the camera is recording. If one of those users later reports
a positive COVID-19 diagnosis, the person doing the recording could
match up the codes the user broadcast at the moment they passed the
camera, identifying a stranger as COVID-19 positive.92
This risk is real, but it is difficult to execute and impossible to scale.
The camera attack is far less likely to identify someone than alternatives
like directly surveilling known COVID-19 testing sites.
More
importantly, the privacy risk it creates is minimal compared to the
information routinely collected as part of manual contact tracing.
The problem is that the Google-Apple system completely ignores
the public health context in favor of protecting user privacy. As one
public health expert put it, the Google-Apple system “took out the most
important piece, which was the location of where people were.”93
Rather than addressing the specific needs of public health authorities in
contact tracing and other processes, the system’s only potential value
lies in its ability to alert some people with access to the right kind of
device that they may have been exposed to an infected person.94 Even
that potential requires relatively high adoption rates among the subset
of people with phones capable of using the system and is subject to
relatively high risk of false positives.
The Safe Paths app proposed a system designed to interface
directly with public health systems and processes, including manual
contact tracing, using that same Bluetooth protocol and adding GPS

91 For a summary of the technical details regarding these risks see Russell Brandon,
Answering the 12 Biggest Questions About Apple and Google’s New Coronavirus Tracking
Project, THE VERGE (Apr. 11, 2020, 10:48 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
4/11/21216803/apple-google-coronavirus-tracking-app-covid-bluetooth-secure.
92 See id.; Andy Greenberg, Does Covid-19 Contact Tracing Pose a Privacy Risk? Your
Questions, Answered, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3f1YICI.
93 Margaret Bourdeaux, Covid State of Play: Building a Public Sector Health
Intelligence Capability, Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/events/covid-state-play-building-public-sector-healthintelligence-capability.
94 For discussions of the need for apps to interface with public health authorities,
see Margaret Boudreaux, et al., The Best Tech for Contact Tracing? Systems Designed for
Healthcare Workers, 9 Interactions XXVII.4, 90 (July–Aug. 2020); see also, Nissenbaum,
supra note 81, at 120.
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location information and time.95 In the abstract, these additional pieces
of information pose substantially more privacy risks than the GoogleApple system because even a fourteen-day location history reveals
sensitive details about a person to the health authority collecting that
information. But manual contact tracing collects that same information,
and the privacy protections Safe Paths incorporates arguably better
protects this information than that process.96
Safe Paths poses two additional risks. First, a person only provides
location information in the manual contact tracing process after they
have tested positive, whereas the Safe Paths app routinely collects and
stores fourteen days of contacts. Collecting and storing those contacts
opens up users to the risk that someone could access those contacts at
any time. Second, users risk reidentification where health authorities
use the de-identified and aggregated location to publish public heat
maps that allow non-users to self-identify possible exposure.97
Safe Paths includes several protections to mitigate both of those
additional risks. First, Safe Paths uses the same decentralized structure
as the Google-Apple system storing both Bluetooth keys and location
information directly on the user’s phone. The system also proposed
several alternatives for protecting sensitive GPS information from
unauthorized access or reidentification.98
This combination of
measures provides users complete control over the information the app
collects; thus, minimizing any privacy risk during the collection process
itself. Notably, they also provide greater protections than many popular
consumer applications that track location, including Google and Apple
maps.99 Second, the Safe Places system allows health authorities to
95 See, e.g., Ananthaswamy, supra note 40; Raskar, Apps Gone Rogue, supra note 35;
Covid SafePaths, supra note 19, at 20–23 (emphasizing need for apps to work with public
health authorities and describing benefits of that collaboration).
96 See Alex Berke et al., Assessing Disease Exposure Risk with Location Data: A
Proposal for Cryptographic Preservation of Privacy, MIT MEDIA LAB, Mar. 31, 2020, at 6–
9, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.14412.pdf; see also Ananthaswamy, supra note 40.
97 See Adding Location Context, supra note 21 (describing threats and identifying
solutions).
98 See PATHCHECK, “GPS+ Solution,” PATHCHECK FOUNDATION [hereinafter GPS+],
https://www.pathcheck.org/en/technology/gps-digital-contact-tracing-solution;
Raskar, Apps Gone Rogue, supra note 35, at 6. Safe Paths proposed several alternatives
for storing the GPS information, including: (1) logging direct GPS information but
without visualization to prevent casual unauthorized access by nosy co-workers,
spouses or employers; or (2) “blurring” GPS information based on population density
and storing only that less precise location also without visualization. It also requires
users affirmatively to consent to upload that information to a public health authoritymaintained server. See Adding Location Context, supra note 21.
99 See ME AND MY SHADOW, Location Tracking, (Feb. 15, 2017), https://my
shadow.org/location-tracking.
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redact any location that a user does not want included in the aggregated
database. It also is set up to delete the raw individual data and to
aggregate that de-identified information.100
In spite of these protections, by allowing users to provide raw
location information directly to a public health authority the Safe Paths
app poses a more significant privacy risk to users than the Google-Apple
app. Using the app to collect this information, however, does not
substantially increase the risk that manual contact tracing poses
because a user provides location information to health authorities
through that process. Once the raw data is destroyed through Safe
Places, no new personal information is retained.
The concern most often identified over collecting location
information with these apps is the risk of surveillance creep. Safe Paths’
decentralized structure largely eliminates that concern. Rather than
creating a new large-scale centralized database, the Safe Paths system
stores that information on users’ phones. Law enforcement authorities
still could seek to access the records of individuals who test positive and
share their stored location data with health authorities. The Safe Places
system accounts for that risk by providing tools for health authorities to
delete the raw data after it is de-identified and aggregated with other
users.
While it is certainly possible with some additional information to
connect an individual to one or more specific locations, it would be
difficult to use the aggregated data to recreate a single person’s location
history or do anything else that is likely to provide useful information in
a law enforcement investigation.101 It would be much easier to gather
the same and much more information from other sources, including
manual contact tracing databases, which maintain records connected to
each individual. Indeed, as Stewart Baker wryly observed “any
authoritarian government worth its salt could get far more location and
contact data simply by subpoenaing Google’s adtech files” than it could
even from a digital contact tracing database that stored location records
connected to each person, much less one like Safe Paths that stores only
aggregated data.102
100

See GPS+, supra note 98; PathCheck Github, supra note 37.
See, e.g., Alsdurf et al., supra note 33, at 17–20 (describing in detail reidentification
and other threats for decentralized contact tracing).
102 Stewart Baker, The Problem With Google and Apple’s COVID-19-Tracking Plan,
LAWFARE, (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/problem-google-and-applescovid-19-tracking-plan. Indeed, Google and several ad tech companies that aggregate
location data already shares that information with public health officials and
researchers as part of their coronavirus response efforts. See GOOGLE, COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports, https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/; PRIVACY
101
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The point in analyzing Safe Paths closely is not to argue that it was
the best model for digital contact tracing. Indeed, there was an active
debate over whether the privacy benefits of a largely decentralized
model system were worth the efficiency and efficacy tradeoffs.103 The
Safe Paths example simply illustrates that Google’s and Apple’s
decisions to impose a single privacy model cut off even highly privacy
protective but still potentially more useful alternatives. It also ended
the progress they were making to pilot and test those options with
several communities.
The next Section first explains how adding only location
information with the privacy protections Safe Paths incorporated could
have been more effective than the Google-Apple model. It then explores
how other types of information have the potential to make these apps
even more powerful tools and how some of that information is critical
to evaluating whether these tools are working and how they are
affecting different communities. Here, again, the claim is not that any of
these possibilities definitively would have worked, only that the rush to
install a single, uniformly limited design prevented even responsible
experimentation with them.
C. Efficacy and Effectiveness
Health researchers carefully distinguish between the efficacy and
effectiveness of new interventions.104 Efficacy reflects how well an
intervention works under controlled, ideal conditions whereas
effectiveness measures its performance in the real world.105 Critiques
of the efficacy of digital contact tracing apps typically focus on the
Google-Apple system and often involve a catch-22: they start with
assuming (or insisting on) the set of privacy controls those companies
have imposed to radically limit the information the apps can collect and

INTERNATIONAL, US State and Local Authorities Strike Deals With Location Data Companies,
(June 15, 2020), https://privacyinternational.org/examples/4008/us-state-and-localauthorities-strike-deals-location-data-companies (noting that “Apple’s and Google’s
refusal to allow contact tracing apps using their system to access location services on
users’ phones creates an opportunity for these data providers”).
103 See Joseph Duball, Centralized vs. Decentralized: EU’s Contact Tracing Privacy
Conundrum, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://iapp.org/news/a/centralized-vs-decentralized-eus-contact-tracing-privacyconundrum.
104 See Amit G. Singal et al., A Primer on Effectiveness and Efficacy Trials, 5 CLINICAL AND
TRANSLATIONAL GASTROENTEROLOGY 1 (2014).
105 Id. at 1.
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what health authorities can do with it and then conclude that this tightly
handcuffed system is unlikely to work.106
Recent studies have used proxies to estimate that even apps using
the extremely limited Google-Apple system are working better than
critics predicted.107
The Safe Paths example illustrates how
incorporating even modest additional information into digital contact
tracing applications increases their efficacy in combating the pandemic
by making them useful to public health authorities as well as users in
several ways.108 The ability to collect even that modest but critical
location information would allow us to test the system’s effectiveness
and tailor it to work better in future iterations. Collecting modest
additional information, including demographic information, would
allow analyses of whether and how the app is helping or harming
specific communities, including those hit hardest by the disease.109
Contrary to what several analyses assert, combining location data
with Bluetooth is far more useful than relying solely on Bluetooth.110
First, it allows for more accurate assessments of exposure.111 Second,
106 See, e.g., Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the
COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS TECH STREAM (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
techstream/inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster
(critiquing the Google-Apple system).
107 See Malcolm Owen, UK Apple-Google COVID-19 App Credited for Prevention of
600,000 Infections, APPLEINSIDER, (Feb. 9, 2021), https://appleinsider.com/articles/21/
02/09/uk-apple-google-covid-19-app-credited-for-prevention-of-600000-infections.
108 See Ramesh Raskar et al., Contact Tracing: Holistic Solution Beyond Bluetooth,
https://github.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/
blob/master/ContactTracingBeyondBluetooth.pdf; COVID SAFE PATHS, COVID-19 ContactTracing Mobile Apps: Evaluation and Assessment for Decisionmakers, https://git
hub.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/blob/master/apps-evaluation.pdf; Maria
Barsallo Lynch & Lauren Zabierek, Considerations for Digital Contact Tracing Tools for
COVID-19 Mitigation: Recommendations for Stakeholders and Policymakers, BELFER CTR.
FOR SCI. AND INT’L AFF. 15 (June 2020), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/
considerations-digital-contact-tracing-tools-covid-19-mitigation-recommendations#
toc-3-3-0 (noting that Bluetooth exposure notification and location services “may
complement each other and yield a more effective solution for contact tracing,” but the
Google-Apple system prohibits it).
109 See Anasthswamy, supra note 40.
110 Margaret Bourdeaux put this most succinctly when she noted that “[Google and
Apple] took out the most important piece, which was the location of where people were.”
Bourdeaux, supra note 93; see also KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 2 (recommending that
contact tracing apps permit users to opt into location tracking). For examples of
analyses stating that location data is unnecessary see WHO, supra note 59 and EDPB,
supra note 59.
111 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; Nancy A. Fairbank et al., There’s an App for
That: Digital Contact Tracing and Its Role in Mitigating a Second Wave, at 13–14,
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2020-05/Contact_Tracing_Report_
Final.pdf; Kostubh “K.J.” Bhagchi et al., Digital Tools for COVID-19 Contact Tracing:
Identifying and Mitigating the Equity, Privacy, and Civil Liberties Concerns, Edmond J.
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an app that collects location information requires lower adoption rates
for the app to work.112 Finally, it makes the apps directly useful for
traditional contact tracing and provides information that health
authorities could aggregate and use to better target scarce resources
and refine their understanding of how the disease spreads and who is
most at risk.113
One of the most significant hurdles for any app is adoption rate.
Several surveys have shown a marked reluctance among Americans to
use these apps.114 Privacy concerns clearly play a substantial role in this
reluctance, but at least one study suggests that in the U.S. people are
somewhat more concerned with an app’s effectiveness than with
privacy, although both issues were likely to result in lower adoption
rates.115 It makes sense that the public is more likely to trust and use a
more robust tool that is more accurate and effective while still
protecting user privacy.
Equally important, adding location and other information, such as
symptoms and health data, could make these apps useful at much lower
adoption rates for several reasons. First, a system like Safe Paths could
be used to assist in manual contact tracing and for the other functions
like identifying emerging hotspots.116 Second, these functions also make
the apps useful for a much larger range of people, including those with
older phones unable to use the Google-Apple system.117
Beyond identifying individual cases, health officials have used
machine learning and other data analytics tools to trace the source or
model the likely future spread of infectious diseases.118 These tools are
especially valuable for outbreaks caused by new diseases, like COVID19, where we lack information about how the disease spreads and what
factors put individuals at risk.119 Critically, these data analytics tools
Safra Center for Ethics, COVID-19 Rapid Response Initiative White Paper 22, July 2,
2020, at 11–12.
112 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19.
113 See Bourdeaux, supra note 93, Podcast Transcript at 7–9.
114 See Kaptchuk et al., supra note 30.
115 Id.
116 See id.; Holistic Solution, supra note 19.
117 See Alex Berke et al., Assessing Disease Exposure Risk with Location Data: A
Proposal for Cryptographic Preservation of Privacy, MIT MEDIA LAB, Mar. 2020, at 3.
118 See Zheng et al., Artificial Intelligence–Enabled Public Health Surveillance—from
Local Detection to Global Epidemic Monitoring and Control, Art. Intell. in Med. 437
(2021), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7484813.
119 See Bourdeaux, supra note 93, at 7–8, (“Relying on digital data sources, such as
data from mobile phones and other digital devices, is of particular value in outbreaks
caused by newly discovered pathogens, for which official data and reliable forecasts are
still scarce.”); Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena, On The Responsible Use of Digital Data to
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have been used in the current pandemic to help triage allocation of
scarce resources to vulnerable communities most at risk from the
disease.
As one data science expert explained recently, combining contact
tracing-related apps with these powerful analytic tools could make
them valuable well beyond alerting users about their own potential
exposure.120 This is because tracking apps can provide the granular,
real-time information about who is contracting the disease, where they
live, and what symptoms they are experiencing; these advanced tools
need to more quickly and precisely identify how the disease spreads,
especially among people and communities at higher risk.121 That same
information could improve pandemic response in a range of other ways,
including quickly tracking the real-time effects of different policy
decisions like re-opening schools and restaurants.122 These potential
applications, when combined with statistical modeling, also require
much lower adoption rates to work.123
Integrating these apps with data provided by other tools like
mobile fitness apps creates even more potential for this kind of
synergistic analysis. The health wearable studies cited at the beginning
of this Article show the tremendous potential for repurposing the
information existing devices already collect.124 Notably, both studies
demonstrated that aggregating information allowed for much faster
diagnoses even in asymptomatic patients.125 This provides a potential
solution to the problem of testing shortages by offering an alternative.
Adding location information could make the notifications even more
accurate by reducing the number of false positives for individuals.
Layering additional information also has the potential to refine our
understanding of when a person who has contracted the disease safely
can return to work or school. One study found that using what the
researchers call risk-based quarantine—essentially incorporating
symptom monitoring for individuals with a common exposure source
Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic, 26 NATURE MED. 463, 463 (2020), available at
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0832-5.
120 Kimon Drakopoulos, The Logic Around Contact Tracing Apps Is All Wrong, WIRED
(Aug. 13, 2020). https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-the-logic-around-contacttracing-apps-is-all-wrong/.
121 See Andrew Curtis et al., Geographic Monitoring for Early Disease Detection
(GeoMEDD), NATURE SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 10 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/
s41598-020-78704-5.pdf.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See supra Part I.
125 See Hirten et al., supra note 1; Mishra et al., supra note 2.
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into manual contact tracing—is potentially more effective than singletest release protocols.126 Another study found that using a mobile selfreporting symptom tracking app predicted the emergence of new
hotspots five to seven days earlier than relying on public health
reports.127
These broader possibilities for using data collected through these
apps and other tools to better understand this disease and identify more
effective responses outside of simple tracking and tracing highlights the
costs of applying a one-size-fits-all set of privacy controls to them.
Several recent studies have concluded that the use of more robust digital
surveillance tools in other countries has both saved lives and mitigated
the devastating economic effects of the pandemic. One retrospective
comparison of six countries’ different use of digital tools as part of their
pandemic response efforts concluded that “early intervention with the
use of digital tools had a strong correlation with the successful
containment of COVID-19.”128 Likewise, a National Bureau of Economic
Research study of South Korea’s broad-based use of digital tools found
the tools likely saved thousands of lives and substantially mitigated the
economic effects of the pandemic by avoiding costly lockdowns.129 A
similar study of China’s extensive use of mobile-phone location data
reached similar conclusions.130
The point of citing those studies is not to argue that the pandemic
justifies wholesale adoption of these more intrusive measures. Indeed,
the protections Part V outlines would preclude many of them. Rather,
these studies suggest that allowing apps to collect—and health
authorities to use—more information than mere Bluetooth proximity
data could make these apps more useful.131
Notably, some of the apps using the Google-Apple system have
implicitly recognized these benefits by finding ways to incorporate
some limited additional data within the tight restrictions these
126

Andrew Perrault et al., Designing Efficient Contact Tracing Through Risk-Based
Quarantining 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 28135, 2020).
127 David A. Drew et al., Rapid Implementation of Mobile Technology for Real-Time
Epidemiology of COVID-19, Science, 368 SCIENCE 1362, 1366 (2020), https://science.
sciencemag.org/content/368/6497/1362/tab-pdf.
128 Kylie Zeng et al., The Use of Digital Tools to Mitigate the COVID-19 Pandemic:
Comparative Retrospective Study of Six Countries, 6 JMIR PUB. HEALTH SURVEILL. 4, 4
(2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7759507/?report=printable.
129 David O. Argente et al., The Cost of Privacy: Welfare Effects of the Disclosure of
COVID-19 Cases, NBER Working Paper 27220, available at, https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w27220/w27220.pdf
130 Kairong Xiao, The Value of Big Data in a Pandemic, Manuscript at 2, 9,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3583919.
131 See Bourdeaux, supra note 93.
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companies have imposed. For example, the UK app has added two
limited forms of location information. First, users are required to input
their postcode and identify their local authority when registering to
allow local authorities to provide specific advice and support, and also
to permit analysis of the app’s effectiveness.132
Second, the app has incorporated an indirect form of location
tracking by allowing users to scan official QR codes posted on some
public venues and store those codes on the device for 21 days.133 The
app does this for precisely the same reasons that Safe Paths proposed
permitting users to store their own location data but in a far more
cumbersome and less effective way. Rather than allowing users to take
advantage of the same location logging functions they already often use
to provide that information to consumer apps, the system requires them
to remember to look for QR codes in places they visit and then physically
scan those codes with their phones.
It also appears that, rather than integrating this with the Bluetooth
keys to create an integrated risk score as Safe Paths and others
proposed, this function operates in parallel so that users who opt into
both may receive separate proximity alerts and venue-based alerts.134
Public health authorities and researchers also cannot access this
information to refine the system or better understand the disease.
Instead, they are left attempting to draw indirect inferences even for
very basic data points that direct location logging easily could
provide.135
By creating an interoperable design standard for Bluetooth
exposure notification, Google and Apple could have facilitated the
development of these more powerful alternatives. Indeed, many people
involved in developing apps applauded their announcement as an

132 See UK Dept. of Health & Social Care, NHS COVID-19 App: Data Protection Impact
Assessment, GOV.UK (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
nhs-covid-19-app-privacy-information/nhs-covid-19-app-data-protection-impactassessment (describing all of the app’s functions, including “addition of local
authorities,” and reasons for these new functions).
133 Id.; see also Briers, et al., supra note 32 (explaining that the QR code “feature allows
health officials to send venue alerts and advice to users, and for users to keep a private
and secure digital log of the places that they have visited, should they ever need to report
this information to contact tracers”).
134 See UK Dept. of Health & Social Care, supra note 132.
135 See Briers et al., supra note 32. This report describes the very sophisticated tools
researchers have used to attempt to assess how the system is working. In one
particularly telling example, the researchers note that they “have just finished producing
preliminary research into the potential for a mobile device to infer whether an encounter
takes place indoors or outdoors. This information could help to inform the risk
calculation, and potentially wider public policy.” (emphasis added).

2021]

JUST PLAIN DUMB?

1497

opportunity for the apps in development to work off a universal,
interoperable core.136 By strictly limiting apps using this tool from
collecting any other information, Google and Apple effectively
foreclosed the possibility of experimenting with both collecting
different combinations of information, except in the highly attenuated
ways the UK example illustrates, as well as alternative privacy models
for protecting that information.
D. Equity
Beyond privacy and effectiveness, another important set of
concerns with using smartphone apps is that they risk exacerbating the
already deeply inequitable effects of the pandemic on marginalized
communities.137 To start, the Google-Apple system depends on owning
an expensive smartphone and consistent internet access. Recent
studies estimate that up to 2 billion of the 3.5 billion phones in use
across the globe will be unable to use this system.138
Even for people with access to smartphones capable of running the
Google-Apple system, the risk of a false positive notification is greater
for many marginalized communities and the consequences potentially
more severe for several reasons.139 The disease is more widespread in
these communities.140 Racial minorities, and Black Americans in
particular, are more likely to live in denser spaces, including apartments
and multi-family units, and are overrepresented essential jobs with
large numbers of interactions, including frontline healthcare workers,
grocery stores, and fast-food restaurants.141
The unnecessary
quarantine that could result from a false positive also is more likely to

136

See, e.g., SafePaths Alliance, Adding Location Context to Apple/Google Exposure
Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths Encryption Proposals for GPS + Bluetooth,
PATHCHECK FOUND. (May 5, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/en/blog/addinglocation-context-to-apple-google-exposure-notification-bluetooth-api-mit-safepathsencryption-proposals-for-gps-bluetooth; ShareTrace, supra note 33, at 4–5, 11.
137 See Delan Devakumar et al., Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19 Responses, 395
LANCET 1194, 1194 (2020).
138 Tim Bradshaw, 2 Billion Phones Cannot Use Google and Apple Contact-Tracing
Tech, ARS TECHNICA (April 20, 2020), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/04/2billion-phones-cannot-use-google-and-apple-contract-tracing-tech.
139 See, e.g., Devakumar et al., supra note 137, at 1194; Susan Landau, et. al., The
Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing, LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.law
fareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing.
140 See Devakumar et al., supra note 137, at 1194.
141 See Adam Nagy, What Digital Contact Tracing Can Teach Us About Public Trust,
Health Equity, and Governance in the United States, MEDIUM (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/what-digital-contact-tracing-can-teachus-about-public-trust-health-equity-and-governance-in-the-510ce5f2c6f6.
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result in lost income or even firing for those in low-wage hourly jobs.142
If use of an app is made mandatory for public or private services, the
higher risk of false positives also could disproportionately deny access
to these same groups.
Many of these issues require the kind of legal protections identified
in Part V. Several of these problems, however, either are a direct result
of the Google-Apple system’s reliance solely on Bluetooth or
exacerbated by its limits. First, as noted above, a system that relies on
both GPS and Bluetooth proximity would be accessible to far more
people. Google’s and Apple’s systems directly exclude people without
access to newer phones. To make matters worse, because the system
collects only Bluetooth information it does not even indirectly benefit
non-users in the ways that location systems can.
Second, adding location information significantly reduces the risk
of false positives that disproportionately harm low-income people and
people of color.143 More importantly, in contrast to the Google-Apple
system, which is designed to minimize involvement of the public health
system and actively prevent it from accessing any information from
users, systems like Safe Paths are designed to interface directly with the
manual contact tracing system.144 Establishing this connection is critical
to providing necessary support and resources and the extensive
benefits of interacting with trained, caring health professionals.
Collecting more information is also critical for health authorities to
better understand how the disease spreads, develop more effective risk
mitigation strategies (including more refined quarantine
recommendations), and more effectively allocate scarce resources to
people at higher risk.145 The Berkman Klein Center for Internet &
Society Digital Pandemic Response Working Group identified as a major
issue of concern the significant gaps in the data we need to understand
the disparate impacts of this pandemic, in particular with respect to
demographic information like race and ethnicity.146 In the absence of
this detailed demographic information doctors and epidemiologists
have resorted to devising improvised tools for estimating the effects of
142

Id.
See Holistic Solution, supra note 19.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Drew et. al., supra note 127, at 3–5 (describing mobile applications
collecting symptoms and other information). For a much more extensive analysis of
how digital technology, including apps, could be deployed to improve pandemic
response, see Petar Radanliev, et al., COVID-19 What Have We Learned? The Rise of Social
Machines and Connected Devices in Pandemic Management Following the Concepts of
Predictive, Preventive and Personalized Medicine, 11 EPMA JOURNAL 311, 312 (2020).
146 Nagy supra note 141.
143
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the pandemic on different groups and to identifying tailored response
strategies.147
Third, by preventing apps using their system from collecting
location and other information, these companies have made it
impossible to conduct the kind of iterative equity analyses that are
essential to assessing whether and how these apps are helping or
harming marginalized groups.148 The Google-Apple system’s privacy
protections make it difficult even to assess whether the app is working
at all and impossible to analyze demographic differences.149
Having this kind of information is essential to configuring apps and
designing complementary alternatives both to maximize access and
ensure they benefit as many people as possible, as well as to minimize
disproportionate harms on particular groups.150 The problem with
Google’s and Apple’s systems is that they have frozen into place a single
design standard that both prevents us from understanding what works
and prevents the kind of experimentation necessary to develop apps or
combinations of apps that could work better for everyone.151
V. TRUSTWORTHY PANDEMIC PRIVACY
Effective disease surveillance does not have to give up on privacy.
Most of the privacy threats digital contact tracing raises could be
guarded against by strong and verifiable restrictions on how every
person’s data is accessed, used, and deleted while still allowing for
broader use of potentially sensitive information, including location
information. We can protect privacy and enable a more effective and
equitable health surveillance system by putting in place a framework
that collects only information necessary for public health, keeps
147 See Karthik Sivashanker et al., A Data-Driven Approach to Addressing Racial
Disparities in Health Care Outcomes, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 21, 2020), https://hbr.org/
2020/07/a-data-driven-approach-to-addressing-racial-disparities-in-health-careoutcomes.
148 See, e.g., KAHN ET AL., supra note 59; Landau, supra note 139 (calling for developing
apps through a process “designed to identify and address potential demographic
disparities early and continuously”).
149 See Chris Wymant et al., The epidemiological impact of the NHS COVID-19 App,
https://github.com/BDI-pathogens/covid-19_instant_tracing/blob/master/
Epidemiological_Impact_of_the_NHS_COVID_19_App_Public_Release_V1.pdf (describing
complex indirect information necessary to estimate effects of UK app).
150 See KAHN ET AL., supra note 59.
151 Id.; see also Zak Doffman, Yes, Apple And Google Have Given Us A Serious Contact
Tracing
Problem—Here’s
Why,
FORBES
(Jun.
19,
2020,
5:17
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/06/19/how-apple-and-googlecreated-this-contact-tracing-disaster (“The rigid policing of a common framework has
tied governments’ hands around the world, offering no flexibility to adapt to scientific
advice on these unprecedented solutions for the global pandemic.”).
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sensitive health data secure from redistribution or repurposing,
transparently monitors how that data is used and assesses whether the
program works and how it affects vulnerable communities.152
Much of the concern over digital contact tracing centers over the
fear that any tool that routinely collects sensitive personal information,
no matter how well intentioned, can too easily be repurposed for use by
law enforcement to use in criminal investigations or the national
security apparatus to spy on individuals. Those concerns are
heightened for people of color who historically have been
disproportionately disadvantaged by new surveillance and other digital
tools.153
The public health context is very different from counterterrorism
or law enforcement. The legitimate need to hide sources and methods
makes meaningful transparency and effective oversight of national
security surveillance programs extremely difficult. Public health, even
during emergencies like the current pandemic, does not require similar
secrecy. Disease surveillance programs can be monitored and audited,
without disclosing personally identifying information, to ensure
compliance with data access and purpose limitations.
Jane Bambauer and I have identified several core features of a
national pandemic privacy law necessary to provide a uniform,
transparent, legally enforceable set of protections to enable the
responsible collection and use of information to protect public health in
future pandemics.154 These include setting up a national data repository
that integrates information from digital contact tracing apps as well as
other relevant sources. Congress, in the March 2020 CARES Act,
required the CDC to develop data-driven COVID-19 solutions and
appropriated $500 million to them for “public health data surveillance
and analytics infrastructure modification.”155 President Biden’s COVID19 national strategy similarly calls for ramping up the federal
government’s collection, production, sharing and analysis of data to

152 Several groups have recommended similar approaches with more detailed
guidelines for implementing them even in the absence of formal legal protections. See,
e.g., KAHN ET AL., supra note 59; see Kelsey Finch et al., Digital Contact Tracing: A Playbook
for Responsible Data Use, (Aug. 14, 2020), https://law.mit.edu/pub/digitalcontact
tracingaplaybookforresponsibledatause/release/1.
153 See Finch et al., supra note 152.
154 See Bambauer & Ray, supra note 5.
155 Daniel Felz et al., BREAKING: Location and Mobile Data in the Fight against COVID19—An Overview of U.S. and Global Efforts, JD SUPRA (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.jd
supra.com/legalnews/breaking-location-and-mobile-data-in-47904/.
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“support an equitable COVID-19 response and recovery.”156 Both
initiatives could incorporate developing this kind of data repository.
The law should limit the data collection system to collecting only
information that is necessary to protect public health. Any information
that in itself or with other information, including location information
should be de-identified and the raw data deleted as soon as possible.
Access to the information should be strictly limited to public health
authorities and any access to law enforcement should be prohibited.
Those use and access restrictions should be enforced through
complete transparency about the system’s design and use without
disclosing any user data. The source code should be open to the public.
The system should log every access to the data and make the access logs
public. And the purpose of any non-routine access should also be
logged. Routine audits should be conducted either by an independent
agency or trusted third party.
Perhaps the most important privacy protection is ensuring that the
data repository lasts only as long as the need for the program. The
program should automatically expire when the emergency has ended or
when an internal or independent review finds that the data surveillance
has not added sufficient value for controlling the outbreak.
Some have questioned whether we need a stand-alone privacy law
to protect the data collected during pandemics and instead call for
incorporating those protections into a comprehensive consumer data
privacy law.157 While I am sympathetic to the idea of a comprehensive
consumer data privacy law—and appreciate the irony inherent in
establishing potentially greater privacy protections for the collection
and use of information during public health crises than for routine
consumer transactions—the public health context is very different from
consumer privacy. Lack of careful thought about those differences and
the tradeoffs we should be willing to make is a large reason we ended
up with the ineffective apps that we have today.
A stand-alone pandemic privacy law is necessary to tailor these
protections to the specific context of public health generally and
pandemics specifically. Several of the protections we identified,
including the automatic sunset clause, make sense only in the
emergency context of a pandemic. Perhaps most importantly, we need
156

Kat Jercich, Biden’s COVID-19 Plan Depends on a Data-Driven Approach for Efficacy,
Equity, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
bidens-covid-19-plan-depends-data-driven-approach-efficacy-equity.
157 E.g., Rich, supra note 60 (“[W]e need a baseline federal privacy law to establish
clear and enforceable privacy rules across the entire marketplace, one that protects our
personal information in good times and in times of crisis.”).
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a pandemic privacy law with the protections just described not merely
(and not primarily) to protect the privacy of the information the system
collects. We need a law that will enable public health authorities to
collaborate with technology developers to develop, test, and refine new
tools to understand and respond to new diseases like COVID-19 quickly
and to ensure that those tools address rather than exacerbate existing
inequalities.158
Our original set of minimum principles left out this key
requirement: the law should require that the system collect the
information necessary to determine whether new digital tools serve
public health needs and how they affect different groups, especially
those most at risk. We recommended that authorization to create the
data repository should include an independent oversight board to
monitor administration of the program. In addition to ensuring that the
information is not used for any purpose other than public health as we
originally proposed, this board should be required to partner with
outside experts to design and conduct iterative studies of whether and
how digital contact tracing methods are assisting in the public health
response and how they can be improved.159 These studies should
include specific analysis of the effects digital contact tracing and related
tools have on vulnerable communities and make recommendations to
correct any injustices attributable to the program as well as to enhance
access.160
That same board also should assess proposed incentives or
disincentives to encourage adoption of new technologies to ensure that
they are equitable, non-coercive and do not discriminate directly or
indirectly against any individual or group.161 Access to public services
and accommodations should not require use of any technology that does
not meet these criteria and that has not been shown to improve public
health outcomes.
Finally, the law should prohibit private companies from controlling
the capabilities of digital contact tracing and other technologies used for
public health surveillance or dictating their terms of use. As the Johns
158 Nagy, supra note 141 (“Authorities need to have a transparent plan for not only
monitoring the effectiveness of these interventions in breaking transmission chains but
also to guarantee against unintended consequences, particularly for already vulnerable
or disenfranchised populations.”).
159 The agenda outlined by a group of Swiss researchers is a useful starting point for
assessing effectiveness. See von Wyl Viktor et al., A Research Agenda for Digital Proximity
Tracing Apps, 2020 SWISS MED. WEEKLY 150 (2020), https://smw.ch/article/doi/
smw.2020.20324.
160 See KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 7–8.
161 See id. at 8.
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Hopkins Project on Ethics and Governance of Digital Contact Tracing
Technologies has emphasized, the design of these technologies “should
be capable of evolving depending upon local conditions, new evidence,
and changing preferences and priorities.”162 This means that public
health authorities, not technology companies, should control what they
do and how they work.163
VI. CONCLUSION
“An average of 3,100 people in the United States died of the
coronavirus each day in January—one every 28 seconds.”164
“[T]he time lag between knowing when a case emerges inside, or
even proximate to the home, and when an intercept team can be
mobilized can literally save lives.”165
“[C]ontact tracing apps do not require tracking the location of
individual users.”166
As I complete this Essay, we just endured the worst month of the
pandemic. As the Washington Post article quoted above starkly states,
in the U.S., deaths peaked in January 2021 at one every twenty-eight
seconds. COVID-19 alone reduced overall life expectancy of Americans
in 2020 by more than one year—the largest single-year decline in the
past forty years.167 That drop is far worse for communities hit hardest
by this disease: falling by over two years for Black Americans and over
three years for Latin Americans.168
As the second quote highlights, epidemiologists tell us that access
to real-time information about who is contracting this deadly disease
and where they live, even if it is not granular enough to identify
exposure definitively, still can save lives. Would a better digital contact
tracing app that included the option for users to collect and share that
information with health authorities have made a difference? We do not
know because we never tried. And we certainly did not know for sure
that they would not back in May 2020 when the EDPB and many others

162

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2.
164 Karin Brulliard, Three Days in the Deadliest Month in the Covid Pandemic, WASH.
POST. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactive/2021/
covid-death-toll-january
165 Curtis et al., supra note 121 (emphasis added).
166 See EDPB, supra note 59.
167 See Rob Stein, Pandemic Shortens U.S. Life Expectancy, Study Concludes, NPR (Jan.
15, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/15/957
209935/pandemic-shortens-u-s-life-expectancy-study-concludes.
168 Id.
163
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decided the answer must be no, even and while many apps were still
proposing to try.169
It is just plain dumb that we never gave them a chance.

169 See KHAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 2 (urging “an approach that recognizes that there
are complicated issues to resolve for governments, institutions, and businesses and that
introduction of [digital contact tracing technologies] must include public engagement
and ongoing assessments to improve both performance and adoption.”).

